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 Post subject: Counterfactual Regret Minimization and Domination in Extensive-F
PostPosted: Sun Aug 12, 2012 2:09 pm 
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Counterfactual Regret Minimization and Domination in Extensive-Form Games

Authors : Richard Gibson

Abstract :

The Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithm is state of the art for computing approximate Nash equilibria of large, two-player zero-sum extensive-form games.
While the current theory only holds in two-player zero-sum games, strategies produces by CFR for games involving more than two players have performed very well in practice.
This short paper provides preliminary theory that attempts to explain the effectiveness of CFR strategies in games with more than two players.
We define strictly dominated actions, a new notion of dominance specific to extensive-form games, and present results suggesting that CFR produces strategies free of domination.

http://www.ualberta.ca/~archibal/papers/gibson.pdf


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